



Advanced Security Services for Computer Simulation Research in Medicine

Jan Meizner¹, Marian Bubak¹, Daniel Haręźlak¹, Tomasz Bartyński¹, Tomasz Gubala¹,
Marek Kasztelnik¹, Maciej Malawski¹, Piotr Nowakowski¹



¹ACC Cyfronet AGH, Krakow, Poland

<http://dice.cyfronet.pl/>





Motivation and objectives



Motivation:



providing proper security mechanisms for advanced medical simulations

To address the following critical security-related aspects:

- Authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA)
- Data security during processing and storage
- Mechanisms to ensure data cannot be recovered given reasonable time and resources, after being deleted



EurValve platform



API – Application Programming Interface

REST – Representational state transfer


Rimrock – service used to submit jobs to HPC cluster

Atmosphere – provides access to cloud resources

git – a distributed revision control system



AAA security use case



- **Step 1-2 (optional):** Users authenticate themselves with the selected identity provider (hosted by the project or an external trusted IdP) and obtain a secure token which can then be used to authenticate requests to the MEE
- **Step 3-4:** User requests JWT token from the Portal, based on IdP or local authentication
- **Step 5** – User sends a request to a service (token attached)
- **Step 6-7** – Service PEP validates token and permissions against the PDP (authorization).
- **Step 8** – service replies with data or error (access denied)

Optional interaction by the service owner:

- **Step A-B** – Service Owner may modify policies for the PDP via:
 - the Portal GUI: **global** and **local**
 - API (e.g. from the Service): **local only**

IdP – Identity Provider


PDP – Policy Decision Point

JWT – JSON Web Token

PEP – Policy Enforcement Point



Registration of a new service



To secure a service its owner first needs to register it in the Portal/PDP.

- **Step 1-2:** Service Owner logs into the Portal, creates the service and a set of Global Policies, and obtains a Service Token
- **Step 3:** Service Owner configures the service PEP to interact with the PDP (incl. setting the service token).


A standard PEP for Web-based services is provided by the DICE team. Custom PEPs may be developed using the provided API.

The Service may use its token to:

- query the PDP for user access
- modify Local Policies for fine-grained access to the service



Security features in the MEE Portal



Security configuration



- Service management – for every service dedicated set of policy rules can be defined
- User Groups – can be used to define security constraints

REST API

- Creating a new user session – as a result, new JWT (JSON Web Token) tokens are generated for credential delegation
- PDP – Policy Decision Point: check if user has access to concrete resource
- Resource policies – add/remove/edit service security policies



Security management via the UI



Services

- Basic security unit where dedicated security constraints can be defined
- Two types of security policies:
 - Global – can be defined only by service owner
 - Local – can be created by the service on the user's behalf

Groups

- Group users
- Dedicated portal groups:
 - Admin
 - Supervisor – users who can approve other users in the portal
- Generic groups:
 - Everyone can create a group
 - Groups can be used to define security constraints



Security management via REST API



Policy management API

Access to the policy management API is authorized by delegating user credentials (using Bearer Authorization header) and providing a service token via the **X-SERVICE-TOKEN** header with each of the requests. The API exposes the following REST methods:

GET /api/policies[?path=...]

path : A coma-separated list of paths or a single path.

Returns a list of policies for a given path (or paths). The matching of paths is exact without any regular expression processing.

Response body:

```
{
  "policies": [
    {
      "path": "...",
      "managers": {
        "users": ["..."],
        "groups": ["..."]
      },
      "permissions": [
        {
          "type": "user_permission|group_permission",
          "entity_name": "...",
          "access_methods": ["..."]
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

Example using cURL:

```
curl -H "X-SERVICE-TOKEN: {service_token}" -H "Authorization: Bearer {user_token}" https://valve.cyfronet.pl/api/policies?path=/path
```

POST /api/policies

Generate user JWT Token

- User (or other service) can generate new JWT token by passing username and password
- JWT token can be used for user credential delegations by external EurValve services

PDP API


- Check if user has right to access a specific resource

Resource policy management

- Create/edit/delete local policies by external EurValve service on user behalf
- Currently integrated with File Store
- Initial ArQ integration tests underway



FileStore encryption use case




- BLOB Data handling:
 - Step 1 – data is sent via encrypted channel to the service
 - Step 2-3 – data encrypted and stored on disk
 - Step 4-5 – data decrypted and retrieved
 - Step A-B (optional) – data stored directly to disk
 - Step 6 (all) – data sent back to the user
- Currently all data is encrypted (steps 1-6)
 - It may be skipped if needed



Communication between the File Store and the Policy Store/PDP



- By default File Store can create top-level private folders
- Each File Store request is evaluated by a PDP on the basis of the requested action, resource path and user identifier
- Storage operations are performed only as allowed by the PDP
- When creating top-level folders a new policy is created, which grants write, read and remove permissions only to the user invoking the operation





Encryption performance (1/2)



- The benchmark evaluates the overhead of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) encryption for the File Store based on various settings
- Results were used to find a compromise between speed and security for a given settings
- Benchmark scenario
 - Generate multiple input files with different sizes
 - Use customized prototype module to encrypt files and measure the overhead (no encryption, AES with 128, 192 and 256 bits keys)
 - Use the same module for decryption – also measure overhead
 - Compare decrypted data vs. input (validate the process)



Encryption performance (2/2)



- Benchmark environment:
 - **CPU:** Intel Core i7 2.3 GHz (4 cores)
 - **RAM:** 16GB DDR3
 - **OS:** Mac OS X 10.9
 - **Java:** 1.8.0_121
 - **Input:** 10 blocks of data 100 MB each (in memory, to avoid network overhead)

- Average speed for AES128
 - Encryption: 98.11 MB/s
 - Decryption: 91.02 MB/s

- Average speed for AES192
 - Encryption: 89.57 MB/s
 - Decryption: 84.25 MB/s

- **Average speed for AES256 (our choice for production)**
 - **Encryption: 87.94 MB/s**
 - **Decryption: 78.56 MB/s**



Data dispersal proof of concept




- Proof of Concept of the solution distributing chunks of data to different backends:
 - Local directories
 - Cloud Services (e.g. AWS S3)
- Mountable as FUSE
- Reduces risk of data leakage if provider is compromised

LUN – Logical Unit Number (Logical Disk)

FUSE – Filesystem in Userspace

AWS S3 – Amazon Web Service S3

DCFS – Distributed Cloud FileSystem





Summary and future work



- Security services has been integrated with the EurValve Model Execution Environment
- We have provided solutions for 2 main use cases:
 - Securing access to the MEE
 - Securing data stored in the FileStore
- Solution has been successfully validated and deployed in production
- We plan to:
 - Add advanced accounting mechanism
 - Consider extending data dispersal POC to make it production ready



EurValve H2020 Project 689617

<http://www.eurvalve.eu>



<http://dice.cyfronet.pl>

